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THE MEANING OF THE FINDINGS
1. Scope of Discussion
The main factual findings of this study, insofar as they deal with
the role of financial intermediaries in the American economy and
with significant structural changes in their operations, summarized
in the preceding chapter on the basis of the detailed material of Chap-
ters III to IX and Appendixes A to I, may be restated as follows:
1. There has been a substantial and generally sustained rise since
the middle of the nineteenth century in the proportion of total na-
tional assets and of all intangible assets that is held by financial
intermediaries. The rapidity of the rise varied, and its pattern
differed somewhat, as between the share in total national assets,
that in all intangible assets, and that in all claims, as is shown in
Chart 1.
2. Among financial intermediaries the role of the banking system
has declined during most of the past century, at least if measured by
total assets. The share of other financial intermediaries has cor-
respondingly increased, particularly that of private and govern.
ment insurance organizations.
3. The share of financial intermediaries in the external financing
of all other groups of economic units taken together has been some-
what above one-half for the entire period from 1901 to 1952. There
apparently has been a tendency for this share to rise moderately.
The increase almost disappears, however, if financing of the fed-
eral government is eliminated from the calculation.
4. Financial intermediaries have increased in importance as out-
lets for personal current saving. Their share has risen from ap-
proximately one-third up to 1929 to over one-half since the 1 930's,
if consumer durables are included. If they are excluded, the rise
iseven more marked—from approximatelytwo-fifthstothree-
fourths.
5. Nonfarm households have at all times during the last fifty
years supplied most of the funds of financial intermediaries. Their
share appears to have increased slightly, from approximately three-
fifths in 1900 to two-thirds in 1952.
These are the main facts to be explained. A satisfactory explana-
tion would require a well-developed general theory of financial in-
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termediaries. Such a theory would have to show, in terms of basic
economic concepts, what determines the role of financial intermedi-
aries in the process of saving and investment, and would have to
explain the size and character of financial intermediaries, the na-
ture of their assets, their share in financing other sectors of the
economy, and their importance as channels of savIng for the other
sectors. The general theory of financial intermediaries thus would
be a parallel, although covering a much broader field, to that part
of monetary theory which deals with the determinants of the volume
of money. At the same time such a theory would constitute part—
and possibly the most important part—of an explanation of what
determines the volume of all intangible assets in an economy, par-
ticularly the relationship of the volume of intangible to that of
tangible assets.
Unfortunately we have only the beginnings of a general theory
either of intangible assets or of financial intermediaries.' From a
survey of these elements and from attempts to expand them, it be-
comes evident that the development of a general theory of financial
intermediaries is a task that cannot be handled as a mere accompani-
ment to this essentially descriptive study of financial institutions in
the United States. The discussion in this chapter has therefore been
limited to(1) a listing of the factors which a general theory of
financial intermediaries will probably identify as the main deter-
minants of the role of financial intermediaries in the economic and
financial structure,2 a role measured primarily by the share of fi-
nancial intermediaries in aggregate national assets; and (2) a brief
consideration of the actual trend of these determining factors dur-
ing the last fifty to a hundred years in order to ascertain to what
extent the facts correspond to theoretical expectations.
1Almostthe only approach to such a theory, and necessarily still a rather
elementary one, that I was able to find in the literature when this chapter was
written is Chapter II of B. Kragh's Prisbildningen p4 kreditmarknaden, Upsala.
1951. Since then considerable progress towards a general theory of financial
intermediaries has been made in two joint articles by John Gurley and Edward
Shaw ("Financial Aspects of Economic Development" in American Economic
Review, September 1955; and "Financial Intermediaries and the Saving-Invest-
ment Process" in the Journal of Finance, May 1956).
2For two other slightlymore detailed though still rudimentary attempts at
analyzing the determinants of the volume of intangible assets see R. W. Gold-
smith, "The National Balance Sheet of the United States of America, 1900-1949."
Income and Wealth, Series IV, Bowes and Bowes, 1955, and "Financial Structure
and Economic Growth in Advanced Countries," Capital Formation and Eco-
nomic Growth, Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Special Conference Series No. 6, 1956.
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2. Immediate Determinants of Role of Financial Intermediaries
in Economic Structure
a. BASIC RELATIONS
Of the different approaches to analyze the factors which determine
the size of financial intermediaries and their position in a country's
economic and financial structure, we shall use the national balance
sheet, and more specifically its right-hand side which shows liabili-
ties and equity of the various sectors of the economy. This approach
has been chosen because it is relatively simple, because it can be
followed through in quantitative terms, and because it seems par-
ticularly relevant, as it centers on the crucial question of what de-
termines the share of financial intermediaries in the flow of funds
from saving to investment. While the number and definition of the
various types of funds and the resulting assets and liabilities are to
some extent arbitrary, it is felt that the arrangement set forth in
Table 1 is sufficiently detailed to avoid obliterating significant dif-
ferences among types of assets and liabilities, and at the same time
not too detailed to obscure essential structural characteristics.
It will be seen from Table 1 that in the United States during the
past half century, the size of financial intermediaries (other than
trust departments) has been influenced primarily by the size of
three components: the volume of nonmetallic money; the volume
of insurance and pension fund reserves; and the volume of other
short-term liabilities (chiefly time deposits) of financial intermedi-
aries. On the other hand, the size of total national assets depends
primarily on four other items, which overlap only to a moderate
extent with those important for financial intermediaries: equity,
both of business and ultimates (households, nonprofit organizations,
and government); bonds and notes; mortgages; and accounts paya-
ble (included in and forming the bulk of item I-1.b of Table 1).
The broadest statement which can be made under this approach
is that the role of financial intermediaries is determined primarily
by the ratio of the sum of money, insurance reserves, and (non-
monetary) deposits in financial intermediaries to the sum of equities,
long-term debt, and accounts payable of all other economic units.
This, however, is only a formal and provisional explanation. It is
no help at all unless we succeed in identifying the factors that in
turn determine the absolute or at least the relative size of the nu-
merator and the denominator of this ratio, and the absolute size of
the components of each or at least ratios among them.
i6TABLE 1






tional mediar- Othertional .mediar- Othertional mediar- Other
TotaliesaSectorsTotaliesSectorsTotaliesSectors
(1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
I.Liabilities 50 15 35 354 131 223 924 390 534
1. Short-term
a.Money (non-
metallic) 7 6 1 32 28 4 146 121 25




reserves 2 2 — 20 20 — 104 104 —
b.Mortgages 7. — 7 .47 —. 47 66 — 66
c.Bonds and
notes 10 — 10 76 3 73 316 2 314
S.Personal trust
fundsb 3 3 80 50
IIEquities 109 3 106 627 23 604 1092 581034
1. Business
enterprises
a. Corporations 28 3e 20 158 130 285 58c227
b. Unincorpo-
rated 6 — 6 28 — 28 69 — 69
2. Ultimates
a. Households75 — 75 425 — 425 849 — 849
b.Governments5 — 5 21 — 21 —111 ——111
III. Total Assets
(liabilities +
equities) 159 18 141 982 154 828 2016 448 1568
u Figures shown in cols. 2, 5 and 8 differ from. those given elsewhere in this study (e.g. Table
10) in that they are derived from national balance sheet totals which donotreflect later re-
visions made in the estimates of the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. Also the national
balance sheets totals, apart from other minor differences, do not include among financial inter-
mediaries finance companies, mortgage companies, and security brokers and dealers, but do in-
clude bank holding companies.
bClassifiedas liabilities although legally no creditor-debtor relationship exists. National total
makes no allowance for personal trust funds administered by nonbank trustees.
c Includes equity in nonprofit and unincorporated financial intermediaries.
Source: A Study of Saving ..., Vol.HI, Tables W-9, W-12 and W-16, except for line I-l.a
which is the sum of currency (bc. cit.)anddemand deposits (Table A-3.a in Appendix A.
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Limiting ourselves to the quantitatively most important factors
involved in the determination of the size of financial intermediaries,
and concentrating on the interrelation between the various items
rather than on their absolute size, we may then approximate the
share of financial intermediaries in national assets (that is, in the
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We are now left with the task of finding economically relevant
determinants for each of the four components of this relation.
Before doing so it may be well to stress what is already evident
from the form in which the various components have been written,
viz., that they can be arranged in two groups of two each. The first
group consists of the ratio of nonmetallic money to total national
assets and the ratio of insurance and pension reserves to total
national assets. The distinctive feature of these two ratios is that
the numerator in each case refers to a type of liability, the debtor
of which is necessarily a financial intermediary.4 If an economic
The following symbols are used in this chapter, including Tables 2 to 5:
AAggregate assets
D Debt of federal government in excess of its assets (sometimes called "dead-
weight debt" in later discussion)
E Equity (net worth)
IInsurance reserves of all types
I'Insurance reserves of private life insurance companies
I" Insurance reserves of pension and retirement funds
L Liabilities (excluding money and insurance reserves)
L' Short-term liabilities (excluding money and insurance reserves)
V' Long-term liabilities
XLayering ratio (consolidated assets —i-- combined assets)
M Money in circulation (excluding full-bodied metallic money)
P General price level
P' Common stock prices
P" Prices of structures and equipment
T Total tangible assets
T' Tangible reproducible assets used in production
Y Income
The subscripts b,f.,h, u, and n refer to business, financial intermediaries,
households (including private nonprofit organizations), ultimates(households
and governments) ,andall units, respectively.
4Full-bodiedmetallic currency in a regime of free coinage is an exception
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unit wants to hold money, in the sense of the accepted means of pay-
ment or of the store of unspecialized purchasing power, this must
be done through one of the financial intermediaries which are re-
sponsible in a modern economy for the issuance or redemption of
money; in the United States at the present time, to take an ex-
ample, it must be done essentially through the Federal. Reserve
system or through the checking departments of commercial banks.
Similarly, if one wishes or is required by law to have insurance pro-
tection, whether in the form of property or life insurance or in the
form of an annuity or pension, he must use an insurance company
or another insurance organization,i.e.a financial intermediary.
There is thus no competition for funds between financial intermedi-
aries and other debtors for these two types of liabilities. Competi-
tion, however, exists among all items on the right-hand side of the
balance sheet of an individual economic unit, hence of groups of
units, and finally of the nation as a whole. Money and insurance re-
serves are therefore to some extent in competition with other claims
against financial intermediaries, and this competition—reflecting the
degree of affinity or substitutability of the different types of assets—
may be fairly pronounced at the borderline.5 The distinction made
in the text is far from being absolute, but it nevertheless has its uses.
In the case of the two other components of the basic relation
(other liabilities and equity), financial intermediaries account for
only a fraction of the total amounts outstanding in the economy;
that is, they have to compete directly for them with other debtors
and issuers. The difference in the situation is indicated in the basic
relation by expressing the ratio of financial intermediaries' liabili-
ties to the national total as a product of (1) the share of financial
intermediaries in the given form of liability and (2) the ratio ol
the national total of this form of liability to total national assets.
It is thus made clear that two separate determinants must be dis-
tinguished, each of which may in turn be the result of several rele-
vant economic factors.
Turning now to the actual course of these ratios since the turn of
the century, Table 2 shows that the four main components of the
in that it permits the holding of money without use of a financial intermedi-
ary, but it is not a situation typical of a modern economy. Fractional coins or
Treasury nonmetallic currency are exceptions only if the Treasury itself is not
regarded as a financial intermediary to the extent of its money-issuing activities,
5Timedeposits in banks, for example, are in direct competition on theone
side with demand deposits representing money, and on the other side with
paid-up insurance contracts.
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basic relation have contributed in different degree to the trend
which is to be explained, the secular increase in the ratio of financial
intermediaries' assets to national assets. More than one-third of the
rise in the ratio, which increased by more than 11 percentage points,
or nearly doubled, between 1900 and 1949, is due primarily to the
second component (the share of insurance reserves in national as-
sets), while very little is due to the fourth component (the share
of financial intermediaries' equity in national assets). It will be
noticed, however, that all four components increased for the period
as a whole, and that in all cases the increase amounted to at least
one-half of the 1900 level.
There is a considerable difference between the two subperiods
before and after 1929. During the first thirty years, when the total
ratio increased slowly, advances in relation to national assets were
substantial in only one case (other liabilities). One component (the
ratio of money to national assets) even showed a decline. The
second period, on the other hand, was dominated by sharp increases
in the two noncompetitive types of funds (money and insurance
TABLE 2











Intermed- surance Liabili- surance Lia bill-Eq.
YEAR iariesMoney Reservesties EquityMoney Reservesties uity
1900 11.9 4.4 1.0 4.9 1.6 37 9 41 18
1912 13.3 4.4 1.3 5.8 1.8 33 10 43 14
1922 15.0 4.4 1.4 7.6 1.6 29 9 51 11
1929 16.0 3.2 2.0 8.5 2.3 20 13 53 14
1933 18.7 3.6 3.4 9.3 2.4 19 18 50 13
1989 24.5 7.0 4.1 11.0 2.4 28 17 45 10
1945 26.1 10.0 4.7 8.9 2.6 38 18 84 10
1949 23.6 7.3 5.2 8.2 2.9 31 22 35 12
1952a 23.4 6.7 5.3 8.5 2.9 29 23 86 12
a The figures for 1952 are rough preliminary estimates. Since no complete breakdown into
components was available at the time of writing, and changes since 1949 are apparently small,
the 1952 ratios are as a rule not discussed in the text.
Source: A Study of Saving ..., Vol.III, Tables W-9 to W-16 (for 1900 to 1949).
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reserves), both of which more than doubled their share in national
assets. In marked contrast the two other, competitive, components
hardly increased at all relative to national assets.
An understanding of the movements of the share of financial in-
termediaries in national assets thus requires separate discussion of
its four main components. Elements of such an analysis are pre-
sented in the next four sections, starting in each case with a brief
theoretical discussion of the main factors that influence a given
component, and following with a glance at the actual course of the
component and its determinants over the last half century. An at-
tempt has been made to use the same factors in the statistical ii-
•lustration as in the theoretical explanation, but some of the requisite
information is not yet available.
b. SHAREOFMONEY IN NATIONAL ASSETS
If all money in circulation is issued by financial intermediaries—as
maybe assumed here for the sake of simplicity°—the public's de-
mand for money determines the amount of liabilities of money-
issuing financial intermediaries, and thus fixes within narrow limits
the total size of their assets, though not the distribution among
different types of assets. Under contemporary American conditions
this means that the volume of check (demand) deposits of com-
mercial banks—one of the largest components of the funds of
financial intermediaries—is determined primarily by the public's
demand for cash.7
6Actually,part of the money in circulation in the United States is issued by
the Treasury rather than by the banking system. The share of Treasury currency
has generally been small enough—it amounted to approximately 3 per cent of
the total in 1952 though to somewhat more in earlier periods (e.g. 8 per cent in
1929 and as much as 20 per cent in 1900 if silver and minor coin is included)—
to justify the assumption made in the text.
7Thisformulation does not imply acceptance of the "cloakroom" theory of
banking, according to which the volume of loans and investments of money-
issuing financial intermediaries is limited to previous deposits. A detailed dis-
cussion which extended over a generation, starting in this country in 1921 with
the publication of Chester Arthur Phillips' Bank Credit, should have made it
clear how and why the banking system as a whole can and does expand (or con-
tract) the volume of its deposits as the result, rather than the cause, of changes
in the volume of its own loans and investment, even though the individual bank
does in fact depend on the volume of its deposits in expanding (or contracting)
its assets. A banking system is thus able to keep in circulation more (or less)
money than the public would want to hold at unchanged prices and interest
rates. Such divergencies, however, will be temporary. Sooner or later an equi-
librium is established—to some extent by the public's decisions about borrowing
from and repaying debt to banks—among the volume of money, the level of
prices and interest rates, and the proportion of its income, transactions or assets,
that the public wants to keep in cash.
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In the search for the determinants of the volume of money a
distinction must be made, at least in. theory, between transaction
(active) money and reserve(inactive) money. Transaction money
is that part of the total money in circulation that economic units
hold for the specific purpose of carrying out their basic economic
activities (buying and selling commodities and services, and cer-
tain transactions in intangible assets). Transaction money may be
regarded as including a customary safety margin for which allow-
ance must be made in calculating cash requirements. Reserve money
is a residual, held either as a reserve for less definitely anticipated
contingencies or simply as undesignated general purchasing power.
It thus represents for individual economic units a temporary use
of funds, but for the entire economy, a permanent block—though
one of changing size and changing ownership.
Monetary theorists have given much thought to the factors which
determine the level of the changes in the volume of money de-
manded by the public, and in recent decades have even devoted con-
siderable statistical study to the subject. Unfortunately, from the
point of view of a theory of financial intermediaries, the relations
that have been explored are those between the volume of money
and income or interest rates, rather than those between money and
other assets. The exact formulation of the factors relating the vol-
ume of money to income varies greatly, but in the case of transaction
money it will usually include the following three characteristics
of the economic process, some of which are of a rather complex
nature:
1. Degree of monetization (proportion of all transactions effected
against money).
2. Degree of layering within the economy (number of inde-
pendent cash-holding units in the chain between producers and
final consumers, and between savers and investors).
3. Length, regularity, and synchronization of the payment and
expenditure periods of different groups of economic units and
different types of transactions.
With a given volume of income, the volume of active money is
higher the longer the average payment and expenditure period (the
higher the proportion of types of transactions and groups of eco-
nomic units with relatively long periods); the more payments and
expenditures are synchronized, i.e. occur on the same dates; the
greater the deviation from the standard pattern in receipts and
expenditures with which cash holders have to reckon; and the
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greater the degree of layering (the greater the number of cash-hold-
ing units involved in the same process). The determinants of the
ratio of active money to income thus are partly organizational (e.g.
the length and synchronization of payment periods), and partly
psychological (e.g. the allowance for variances in receipts and ex-
penditures).
The factors that determine the volume of inactive money out-
standing at any one time in an economy, and the changes in that
volume, are probably more varied and not easily amenable to
quantification. To say, as is often done, that they depend on the
"liquidity preference" of the different groups of economic units
does not help much unless the form of the function is specified—
that is, until a statement can be made in quantitative terms about
the relationships of the amount of inactive money held and other
measurable economic variables such as past, present, and expected
incomes, asset holdings, prices, and interest rates. Very little is as
yet known about these relationships. To explore the determinants
of the volume of either active or inactive money is beyond the com-
pass of this study, but it is well to realize that these factors deter-
mine the size of a considerable part of the funds of financial in-
termediaries.
Using the symbols defined earlier in. the chapter, the ratio we
have to explain is This ratio is usually regarded in mone-
tary theory—insofar as an attempt is made at explaining it—as a
weighted average of ratios between cash holdings and total assets
of different groups of economic units, or perhaps better still, as
a combination of two such weighted averages, one for transactions
money and the other for reserve money (although the latter separa-
tion cannot yet be carried over easily into statistical calculations).
To bring out the relations which are particularly relevant to a
theory of financial intermediaries it is preferable, however, to break
the over-all ratio into four factors:
—,—, —, and—.
The of these factors is essentially the same thing as the well-
known Cambridge k of the fundamental equation M =kY.The
second factor is the reciprocal of the capital-output ratio multiplied
by the ratio of reproducible tangible assets used in production (the
numerator of the capital-output ratio) to total tangible assets,
23THE MEANING OF THE FINDINGS
since on a national level=(the equity of all ultimate do-
mestic economic units is equal to the value of all tangible assets
adjusted for net foreign balance). The third factor is the share of
the equity of ultimates in the aggregate equity of all economic Units,
and therefore is related to the relative size of the business sector in
the economy, since the aggregate equity in the national balance
sheet is the sum of the equity of ultimates and of business
prises (corporations and unincorporated businesses). This ratio also
reflects the proportion of cumulated saving by ultirnates and by
business enterprises if, but only if, there are no revaluations affect-
ing the national balance sheet (i.e. no realized or unrealized capital
gains and losses). The fourth factor, finally, is the complement of
the national indebtedness ratio.
It may thus be said that the ratio the first of the four
components in our basic relation, can be resolved into four eco-
nomically significant ratios (or relatively simple transformations of
them) applicable to the economy as a whole:
1. Cambridge k
The capital-output ratio
3. The ratio of business to ultimates' equities
4. The national indebtedness ratio
Turning from theory to observation, it is seen from Table 2 that
the ratio of money8 to national assets has shown during the first
half of this century several marked and significant movements. After
two decades of stability at slightly below 5 per cent of national
assets, the ratio declined sharply during the 1920's, falling to not
much over 3 per cent in 1929. This decline was an interesting con-
comitant of the peculiar inflation of that period which centered
on the prices of equities without greatly affecting those of corn-
modities. Between 1929 and the end of World War lithe share of
8Itmay be well to recall thatthroughout this section includes all money
issued, i.e. total money in circulation in the usual definition(see e.g. Banking
and Monetary Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1943, pp. 11ff. and 404ff.) and also currency and bank deposits held within the
banking system. The ratios and shown here are therefore some-
what higher, and also rise somewhat more than the more familiar figures. This
divergence could be avoided by splitting both ratios into two parts, one cor-
responding to Cambridge k as usually defined, the other being the ratio of
as used here and as defined customarily.
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money in national assets rose precipitously and probably more
rapidly than ever before, reaching a level of 10 per cent in 1945.
Some of this rise proved to be temporary, but even in 1949 (and
apparently in 1952 too) the ratio, then slightly above 7 per cent,
was still higher than at any time between the turn of the century
and the beginning of World War II.
It is unfortunately not possible to separate active and inactive
money in a statistically satisfactory way, though it would seem that
most of the sharp rise in the ratio since 1929 is due to an
expansion of inactive money relative to other assets. What is evident
from Table 3 is that except during the Great Depression and pos-
sibly World War II, most of the changes in the ratio of total (active
and inactive) money to national assets can be traced to changes in
the ratio of money to income. Between 1900 and 1949 the ratio of
money to assets increased by 66 per cent; that of money to income,
by 55 per cent. This implies that the capital-output ratio has re-
mained fairly stable—again except during the Great Depression and
World War Il—and column 3 of Table S indicates that this has
been the case. The table also shows that fluctuations in the ratio
of business to ultimates' equities (column 5) and the national in-
debtedness ratio (the complement of column 6) have been moderate
and partly offsetting in their effect on the ratio of money to national
assets, though they do exhibit a downward trend throughout the
period. The sharp increase in Cambridge k during the second half
of the period—indeed mostly during the 1930's—thus turns out to
TABLE 3











1900 0.044 0.452 0.373 0.521 0.732 0.685
1912 .044 .449 .400 .478 .769 .672
1922 .044 .476 .364 .568 .705 .632
1929 .032 .372 .376 .511 .712 .639
1933 .036 .674 .210 .625 .708 .582
1939 .070 .858 .322 .634 .724 .554
1945 .100 .864 .568 .631 .676 .475
1949 .073 .701 .407 .695 .676 .542
Source: Derived from figures given in Appendix Table A-3.a, and A Study of
Saving. .., Vol.III, Tables W-9 to W-16 and Table N.1.
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be the most important factor in the observed rise of the ratio of
money to national assets between 1900 and 1949.°
C. SHARE OF INSURANCE RESERVES IN NATIONAL ASSETS
The over-all ratio to explain is (assuming I,. = Ix), where
I, includes both the reserves on the entirely voluntary contracts with
life insurance companies and fraternal orders and the reserves in
social insurance, government, and private pension and retirement
funds that involve various degrees of compulsion. The ratio as it
stands does not lend itself well to analysis. For that purpose we have
to split it into two 'factors, and AhIAfl. The first multipli-
cand (the ratio of the value of insurance reserves to aggregate as-
sets)is limited to individuals since they are practically the only
beneficiaries of insurance reserves. It should be further divided into
two additive components, the ratio of voluntary life insurance
reserves to aggregate assets, ,andthe ratio of social security,
etc. reserves to assets, components subject to quite different
influences. The second multiplicand is in the nature of a
correction factor needed to fit the first multiplicand into the basic
relation that uses total national assets as denominator. The sub-
stantive problem then is to identify the determinants of the two
components of Ih/Ah, a task not made easier by the lack of previous
work in the field.
The volume of voluntary insurance reserves is a good example of
the varied influences chat determine the size of financial intermedi-
aries. At any one time at least half-a-dozen factors are important
in determining the size of these reserves, e.g.:(I) the total amount
of insurance in force;(2) the distribution of insurance in force by
type of contract, particularly among ordinary life, term, endow-
ment, and annuity contracts;(3) the past rate of increase of in-
surance in force;(4) the rate of earnings on assets;(5) the ratio of
cost of operation to income; and (6) mortality.
9Thereis also some interest in factoring differently, taking together,
first, the two components reflecting basic economic factors(k and the capital-
output ratio) and, secondly, the three remaining components. It will then be
seen that the two newly formed combined components are quantitatively of
about equal importance for that the first component
Y T' n
has fluctuated considerably more than the second; and that the long-term trends
in the two components have been in different directions—upward in the first,
downward in the second—but more pronounced in the first, the direction of
which thus has also determined the upward trend in the over-all ratio
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One of these factors is related positively to the amount of reserves
of life insurance organizations: reserves will be higher, other things
being equal, the larger the insurance in force. Other factors; how-
ever, are inversely related to reserves. The higher the mortality rate,
the yields on assets, or the proportion of costs of operation to in-
come, and the higher the rate of increase in insurance outstanding
(the lower the average age of contracts), the lower, other things
being equal, life insurance reserves. The relationship is more com-
plicated for the distribution of insurance in force by type of con-
tract. In relation to insurance in force, reserves are larger the
higher the proportion of contracts that involve a substantial ele-
ment of saving, particularly endowment and annuity contracts, and
the lower the share of term insurance which calls for only very
small or no reserves.
These formal relationships are only a partial answer as to the
determinants of the size of life insurance reserves. There remains,
above all,thequestion of what determines the amount of insurance
of different types in force, particularly of ordinary life insurance
including endowments and annuities, which is responsible for the
bulk of reserves. The subject has not been sufficiently explored to
enable us to make statements of general applicability and validity.
It is evident, however, that individuals' motivations and attitudes
with respect to their insurance contracts are complex. There is,
first, the question of the extent to which individuals (other than
those for whom insurance is primarily a means of financing funeral
expenses) regard their life insurance contracts as protection against
the risk of premature death or unexpectedly protracted old age,
or treat them strictly as the means of systematic saving intended
to provide for the anticipated period of retirement or to create
an estate. To the extent that life insurance is purchased as protec-
tion to provide for the definite needs of old age, it is possible to
calculate the amounts required by individuals, and hence to esti-
mate, with the aid of information about mortality and length of
working life and retirement period as well as about earnings and
expense ratios, the corresponding reserves of life insurance organiza-
tions, once certain assumptions are made about the relation of de-
sired protection or retirement income to average income during
earning life. To the extent, however, that insurance is used as a
means of saving without a definite goal in terms of protection, re-
tirement income, or estate in the mind of the insured, such con-
siderations do not apply. Another dichotomy is also relevant. Inso-
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far as life insurance contracts are made with the purpose of adding
the proceeds to individuals' total undesignated saving, life insur-
ance is in direct competition with all other forms of saving. This
is not the case insofar as accumulation of life insurance reserves is
the result of straight life contracts, where they are necessitated by
the combination of level premiums and changing mortality risks, or
of annuity contracts.
While the difficulty in the case of voluntary life insurance re-
serves and their relation to individuals' aggregate assets is the multi-
plicity of factors involved and the complexity of several of them,
the problem raised by the size of the reserves against social insur-
ance and pension plans is rather one of indeterminacy. For most
of these forms of insurance the amount of reserves is determined
only in part, and often only in minor part, by actuarial calculations;
and beneficiaries have little if any direct voice in determining the
size of the reserves. Although we thus cannot say much about the
determinants of the actual size of reserves, it may be well to list
the main factors of rationally determined(i.e. actuarial), reserves
of retirement and pension funds:(1) the number of people cov-
ered by pension and retirement plans entitled to benefit payments,
and their income;(2) the length of retirement life(the life after
the average age at which benefit payments start);(3) mortality dur-
ing retirement life;(4)averageretirement income;(5) the rate
earned on the assets of pension and retirement funds.
The absolute amount of reserves is directly related to factors 1,
2, and 4, and inversely related to factors 3 and 5. The question of
primary interest here, however, is not the absolute level of re-
serves but their relation to national assets. If we assume that na-
tional assets are a constant multiple of national income or product
(which means that the product of the capital-output ratio, the
ratio of reproducible to total tangible assets, and the financial in-
terrelations ratio is constant, though each of the three components
may vary), we may also make some statements about the deter-
minants of the ratio of reserves to national assets. Under that as-
sumption,'0 the ratio will be positively related to:(1) the propor-
tion of the population above retirement age entitled to benefits;
(2) the ratio of the length of average retirement life to average
working life;(3) the ratio of average retirement income to average
10Ofcourse, unless the assumption of constancy of the ratio of national assets
to income or product is made, this very ratio enters as an additional independent
factor into the calculation of reserves and is inversely related to the size of re-
quired reserves.
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working life income. The ratio will be inversely related, as before,
to:(4) mortality during retirement life;(5) the rate earned on
reserves. To these may be added a further, and in practice a very
important, factor that probably is positively related to the ratio
of reserves to national income: (6) the proportion of actuarially re-
quired reserves actually funded (i.e. represented by fund assets).
Table 4 shows the actual course since the beginning of the
century of the ratio of insurance reserves to total household assets,
and of the correction factor (the share of households in national
assets), which has shown an irregular and rather slight downward
trend over the period and thus has had only a minor effect. The
movements of the ratio of reserves to household assets are char-
acterized, first, by a sharp upward trend—the steepest shown for
any of the four components of the share of financial intermediaries
TABLE 4





Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1900 0.010 0.019 — • 0.528
1912 .013 .025 — .538
1922 .014 .027 .001 .499
1929 .020 .036 .004 .500
1933 .034 .062 .011 .461
1939 .041 .074 .018 .449
1945 .047 .063 .040 .451
1949 .052 .063 .049 .463
Col. 2 includes (and col. 3 excludes) insured pension plans. If the reserves
attributable to these plans are shifted from col. 2 to col. 3, on the argument
that many of these plans have a semicompulsory character, the figures for the







These figures are based on the assumption that throughout the period the re-
serves underlying insured pension plans were equivalent to 10 per cent of group
life insurance in force, the 1950/1954 ratio(Life Insurance Fact Book 1955,
pp. 26, 33). This procedure somewhat overstates the reserves behind insured pen-
sion plans, and hence the extent of the shift from col. 2 to col. 3.
Source: Same as Table 3.
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in national assets throughout the period; and, second, by the pre-
dominance of the nonvoluntary component in the increase of the
ratio since the 1930's.
The statistical material unfortunately does not permit calcula-
tion for either the voluntary or the compulsory forms of insurance,
of the contribution of the various determining factors listed earlier
to the movements of the ratio of insurance reserves to household
or national assets. But there is little doubt about the main factors
at work.
The observed increase of the ratio of reserves in pension and
retirement funds to the aggregate assets of households is due pri-
marily to a sharp increase in the proportion of the population (par-
ticularly the retired population) covered by such plans. At the turn
of the century the number of beneficiaries of these plans was vir-
tually zero, whereas at the present Lime most former wage and
salary earners are covered by them. In addition, virtually all the
other factors listed as determinants of the size of reserves have con-
tributed to the increase in the ratio. In particular, the proportion
of retirement life to working life—which is positively related to
required reserves—has gone up considerably during the lastfifty
years as a result mainly of three developments: the later start of
working life, which reflects a lengthening of the period of school-
ing; earlier retirement, due in no small measure to the spread of
pension and retirement plans themselves; and an increase in the
average length of life, resulting at least in part from advances in
medicine.11 The rate of earning on fund assets has declined, but
since it' is inversely related to required reserves, the development
has reinforced the tendency towards increasing reserves implied in
the increase in the ratio of retirement to working life, in the upward
trend of desired retirement income, and in the increasing emphasis
on annuities as against straight life insurance.
d. SHARE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN NATIONAL LIABILITIES
OTHER THAN MONEY AND INSURANCE RESERVES
From a theoretical point of view, the third component of the basic
relation is probably the most interesting factor in determining the
11 Although the statistics are not sufficient for close ineasurerncnt, particularly
because of their deficiencies in accurately reflecting the situation around the turn
of the century, it is likely that the ratio of average retirement to working life
has doubled, viz., from approximately one-thirteenth in 1900 to one-seventh in
1940 and possibly has further increased in the last dozen years (see e.g. S. Wolf-
bein in Annual Proceedings of Industrial Relations Research Association, 1954).
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share of financial intermediaries in national assets. It is also the
one most difficult to analyze. The first two components dealt with
two noncompetitive types of liabilities in which the determination
of the total volume outstanding was practically identical with that
of the volume attributable to financial intermediaries, and the
fourth component is of small practical importance. The third com-
ponent calls for evaluation of the seemingly simple and straight-
forward ratio of financial intermediaries' "other" liabilities to all
liabilities in the combined national balance sheet both excluding
money and insurance reserves. But it presupposes the results of
an investigation into what may be regarded as the most important
subject of the theory of financial intermediaries, the competition
between financial intermediaries and other borrowers for free
funds, i.e. funds that are not by their nature bound to be directed
towards financial intermediaries(e.g. money and insurance re-
serves) or towards nonfinancial users(e.g.participation in the
equity of unincorporated business enterprises).
The over-all ratio of financial intermediaries' "other" liabilities
to national assets, can be factored into three components.
The first component, the ratio of financial intermediaries' to nation-
al assets L,/ —L,),close
to the more significant ratio of claims held by financial intermedi-
aries and by other units.12 It is thus an indication of the aggregate
ratio between direct and indirect debt financing of all units other
than financial intermediaries, a basic characteristic of financial
structure. The second component is the ratio of "other" liabilities
to total liabilities in the national balance sheet,
The third is the ratio of national liabilities to national assets,
i.e., the national indebtedness ratio. This ratio is another very im-
portant characteristic of financial structure, which should be vis-
ualized as a weighted average of indebtedness of different sectors of
similar groups of economic units.
12 This statement is based on the assumption that the claims held by financial
intermediaries are roughly equal to their own liabilities.
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The main determinant of the national indebtedness ratio, which
can also be written as
++
+++
is the internal financing ratio, the ratio between internally sup-
plied funds—saving—and total supply of funds. Indeed, if revalua-
tions (realized and unrealized capital gains and losses) are absent,
the two ratios are equal. Actually, they always differ, though to a
varying extent; and the main cause of the differences—the change
in price of assets (chiefly for tangibles and equities)—is the second
main determinant of the indebtedness ratios. There are obviously
further economic factors behind these two determinants, but their
analysis, although essential for full understanding of the role, of
financial intermediaries, lies well beyond the scope of this brief
summary.
The ratio of financial intermediaries' liabilities to national lia-
bilities, the product of the first two components, needs to be scru-
tinized more closely, particularly insofar as it can be regarded as
the result of the competition between direct and indirect holding
of free claims (claims not necessarily making use of financial inter-
mediaries) by the different sectors of the economy other than finan-
cial intermediaries.
In choosing between direct and indirect placement, households
and business enterprises—and occasionally governmental organiza-
tions too—with funds available will usually consider the following
factors insofar as they are relevant, or at least would consider them
if they acted consciously and rationally:
1. Yield of different forms of placement
2. Liquidity
3. Risk of loss
4. Stability of 1rice or yield
5. Divisibility
6. Convenience
7. Preservation of purchasing power
8. Income tax provisions
9. Legal arrangements and government regulation
A discussion of these factors will be found in Appendix H, as not-
withstanding its general and summary nature it would take up too
much space at this point.
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In actuality, as Table 2 showed, the ratio of financial intermedi-
aries' "other" liabilities to national assets increased continuously
and fairly sharply from the turn of the century to the end of the
1930's, but by 1949 was back to the level reached two decades earlier.
Both major components participated in the increase, but in differ-
ent rhythm evident in columns 2 and 3 Table 5. The share of finan-
cial intermediaries intotalliabilities(other than money and
insurance reserves) reached its high in 1939 after an almost continu-
ous and rather sharp rise over the preceding forty years. The ratio
of liabilities(other than money and insurance reserves) to assets
in the national balance sheet, on the other hand, rose until the
end of World War II, but rather erratically. This was entirely due
to a sharp increase, particularly after 1929, of the national indebt-
edness ratio (column 5), which in turn was primarily a reflection of
the federal government's borrowing. The share of "other" liabili-
ties to total liabilities in the national balance sheet (column 4), on
the other hand, fluctuated only slightly from 1900 to 1933 but
declined substantially in the following decade as currency, check-
ing deposits, and insurance reserves gained in relative importance,
changing the structure of national liabilities. Thus, in contrast to
the trend of the two noncompetitive types of funds in relation to
national assets, most of the advance in the ratio of financial inter-
mediaries' "other" liabilities to national assets occurred in the
period before rather than after 1929.
TABLE 5
Determinants of Share of FinancialIntermediaries'Liabilities
(Excluding Money and Insurance Reserves) in National Assets
L1 LI?. ++
++ A,,
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1900 0.049 0.188 0.261 0.828 0.315
1912 .058 .215 .270 .824 .328
1922 .076 .245 .310 .843 .368
1929 .085 .276 .309 .855 .361
1933 .093 .269 .348 .833 .418
1939 .110 .328 .335 .750 .446
1945 .089 .236 .379 .722 .525
1949 .082 .246 .334 .729 .458
Source: Same as Table 3.
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e. SHARE OF EQUITY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN NATIONAL ASSETS
The fourth term of the basic relation, the ratio between the equity
in financial intermediaries and aggregate national assets—usually
by far the smallest of the four components—is in itself of little eco-
nomic importance. But it can be factored into three components,




The first component, the ratio of the equity of financial inter-
mediaries(as here defined)'3 to the equity in all business enter-
prises is quite small. In the United States it has risen during
this century, as Table 6 indicates, from approximately one-tenth to
one-sixth. There are two reasons for its relatively small size. First,
TABLE 6








(3) (4) (5) (6)
1900 0.016 0.089 0.267 0.685 1.366 0.501
1912 .018 .115 .231 .672 1.300 .517
1922 .016 .085 .295 .632 1.419 .445
1929 .023 .125 .288 .639 1.405 .445
1933 .024 .140 .292 .582 1.413 .412
1939 .024 .154 .276 .554 1.382 .401
1945 .026 .170 .324 .475 1.480 .321
1949 . .029 .163 .324 .542 1.480 .366
Source: Same as Table 3.
13Forthe purpose of this study thc equity of financial intermediaries has been
limited to (1) the book value of the stock of banks, property insurance companies,
and investment companies; and (2) the surplus of life insurance companies, sav-
ings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions, all of which (with
the exception of a number of life insurance companies) are operated as mutuals.
The so-called share capital of savings and loan associations and of credit unions
has been treated as a liability because that is what it economically is, irrespec-
tive of legal appearance. The same treatment has been applied to beneficiarie?
interest in the assets administered by personal trust departments, although
actually no creditor-debtor relationship exists here, in order to avoid classifying
these funds with the equity of the administering institutions. That it would
have been preferable to regard these funds as part of the assets and hence as
reflected in the equity of the individual beneficiaries is arguable; but to do so
would not have been compatible with the treatment of personal trust depart-
ments as financial intermediaries.
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the total assets of nonfinancial business enterprises are generally
larger than those of financial intermediaries. Secondly, the propor-
tion of equity to total assets is almost always considerably lower
among financial intermediaries than among other business enter-
prises. This in turn reflects one of the main characteristics of finan-
cial intermediaries—their function as a funnel for funds supplied
by other economic units—and the ensuing tendency of reducing
financial intermediaries' equity to the position of a guarantee fund
rather than using it as the source of a substantial fraction of inter-
mediaries' total funds.
The second component, the share of business equity in total
equity, or the relation between the equity of business enterprises
and ultimates,
E1+ b+Eu
isa factor of great economic significance and is closely connected
with the relative importance of business enterprises in the econ-
omy. More specifically, it is influenced (1) by the share of business
enterprises in aggregate national assets,(2) by the ratio of equity
to assets of business enterprises, and (3) by the layering ratio of
business equities(the ratio between the combined and the con-
solidated total equity of all business enterprises in corporate or
unincorporated form). This component has shown a slow and ir-
regular increase, rising from not much over one-fourth in 1900 to
almost one-third since World War II.
The third component, the ratio of the combined equity of all
economic units to aggregate national assets, .is of considerable in-
terest in itself—it is the complement to the ratio of national liabili-
ties to national assets encountered in subsection (cl)—and •can be
further factored into(1) the ratio of the aggregate equity in the
national balance sheet to the equity of ultimates, which in turn is
equal to national wealth, ;and(2) another ratio, EU/An,
which is closely related to the reciprocal of the financial interrela-
tions ratio
• I
ifnet foreign balance is ignored. In contrast to the first two com-
ponents of the ratio between equity in financial intermediaries and
national assets, the third has shown a fairly Continuous though
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rather irregular decline, reflecting the increasing size, on a national
scale, of debt relative to assets. Its decline has been due exclusively
to the downward trend in the second factor(i.e. the rise in the
financial interrelations ratio), since the first factor shows a slight
upward movement which reflects a decline in the share of ultimates
(hence an increase in the share of business) in national equity.
3. Ultimate Economic Determinants
While the immediate determinants of the share of financial inter-
mediaries in national assets lend themselves to expression in a small
number of fairly well defined and measurable relations which it
was possible to review one by one, such a systematic procedure is
not yet feasible in the case of what may be called the ultimate eco-
nomic determinants. At best, the preceding section may have suc-
ceeded in identifying some basic economic facts or relations that
influence the immediate determinants. We are not yet able to show
the quantitative relationships between ultimate and immediate
determinants, if indeed they exist, in either algebraic or statistical
terms. We cannot even be sure that all important ultimate factors
have been identified. Hence, we can only review the actual course
of those of the supposed ultimate determinants for which statistical
data are available and see how their movements may have affected
the observed course of the ratio of financial intermediaries' assets
to national assets, a ratioare trying to explain. In this rudi-
mentary attempt it is well to distinguish two types of ultimate de-
terminants: first, ratios derived from a national balance sheet; sec-
ond, certain factors which have been suggested as explaining the
distribution between direct and indirect holdings of claims, a re-
lation which has been regarded as one of the most important fac-
tors determining the position of financial intermediaries in the
economic structure.
a. NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET RATIOS
Among balance sheet ratios (some of which have already come into
the discussion) the following appear to be of substantial importance
in influencing the trend in financial intermediaries' share in na-
tional assets:
1. The size of the business sector, which may be measured by the
share of corporations and unincorporated business enterprises in
national assets, tangible assets, or equity (excluding financial inter-
mediaries from both numerator and denominator). These ratios
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assumed as a rule to have a positive though slight correlation to the
share of financial intermediaries in national assets: when they
rise (or fall), the share of financial intermediaries may be expected
to increase (or decrease), other things being equal.
2. The financial interrelations ratio (the ratio of intangibles to
tangibles in the national balance sheet). This ratio(see, for ex-
ample, Table 7,column1) may be expected to be positively related
to the share of financial intermediaries in national assets. Indeed
it must be so related unless the share of financial intermediaries in
intangible assets moves in the opposite direction.
B. The capital.output ratio (Table 7,column5). This ratio is
a component of the share of money in national assets and also in-
fluences the financial interrelations ratio and the size of the business
sector.
4. The deadweight debt ratio. It is theoretically defined as the
proportion to national assets of debt in excess of debtors' assets, but
in practice has to be measured (as in Table 7,column6) as the
ratio of the deficit (negative equity) in the balance sheet of the
federal government to aggregate national assets, thus ignoring the
fact that some units in other sectors also have deadweight debt. Not
much can be said a priori on the effect of changes in deadweight
debt on the share of financial intermediaries in national assets. The
effect will depend chiefly on the extent to which war expenditures,
historically responsible for most deadweight debt, are financed by
borrowing from the banking system (more accurately, by sales to
central and commercial banks which lead to an expansion in check-
ing deposits) or from other lenders. If the banking system absorbs
most of the deadweight debt, an increase in the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets is to be expected, but is not cer-
tain, since the ensuing inflation may sufficiently raise the value
of tangible assets and equities, of which financial intermediaries
hold but little, to prevent the share from rising. Otherwise a de-
cline in the financial intermediaries' share is more likely.
5. The short-long debt ratio. This ratio may be defined in two
ways, one including and the other excluding money and insurance
reserves from calculation. Under the second method (used in Table
7, column 7), the ratio is positively related to the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets. Calculated by the first method,
the ratio might be either positively or negatively related, because
the relation between insurance reserves and other long-term debt
may move differently from the ratio of short-term liabilities of finan-
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cial intermediaries (other than money) to the aggregate of such
liabilities in the national balance sheet. The short-long debt ratio
possibly overlaps the deadweight debt ratio, since both short- and
long-term liabilities may include deadweight debt.
6. Layering ratios.(a) The layering ratio of financial intermedi-
aries taken by itself is, of course, positively related to the share of
financial intermediaries in national assets;(b) the layering ratio of
nonfinancial business, on the other hand, is more likely to be in-
versely related.14
We thus have four ratios which may be expected, as a rule, to be
positively related to the share of financial intermediaries in na-
tional assets: the relative importance of the business sector (column
2 in Table 7),thefinancial interrelations ratio (column 1), the
short-long debt ratio exclusive of money and insurance reserves
(column 7), and the layering ratio of financial intermediaries (col-
umn 8); one ratio which may be expected to be inversely related
to the share of financial intermediaries in national assets: the layer-
ing ratio of nonfinancial business; and two ratios whose relation to
financial intermediaries' share in national assets is doubtful: the
capital-output ratio(column 5) and the deadweight debt ratio
(column 6). Table 7 shows the actual movements of these ratios.
For the first half of the twentieth century taken as a whole, two
of the seven ratios did not change much (the relative importance
of nonfinancial business and the layering ratio of financial inter-
mediaries). Two went up substantially (the financial interrelations
ratio and the deadweight debt ratio); two went down (the capital-
output ratio and the short-long debt ratio); and one is unknown
(the layering ratio of nonfinancial business). Since neither the
numerical nor the algebraic relationship of each of these ratios to
the share of financial intermediaries in national assets is known, we
are unable to calculate the net combined effect of all six ratios.
b. PRICE MOVEMENTS
Probably the most important of the ultimate determinants of the
share of financial intermediaries in national assets which are in-
dependent of the national balance sheet are the movements of
asset prices. Movements in the prices of real estate and corporate
stock, of equipment and inventories, directly affect the share of
financial intermediaries in national assets because most of the assets
14 Statistical material at hand does not yet permit calculation of the layering
ratio of nonfinancial business for a protracted period.
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held by financial intermediaries are not subject to such price
changes, whereas the majority of the assets owned by all other
groups taken together are. Hence the share of financial intermedi-
aries in national assets will tend to move inversely to asset prices,
other things being equal. Asset prices in turn move in the same
direction as the general price level (measured, for example, by the
so-called gross national product deflator), although sometimes with
considerable lags and often in a proportion differing from the rise
or fall in the general price We might therefore expect the
ratio of financial intermediaries' assets to national assets to decline
during periods of rising prices and to increase during periods of
declining prices. Alternatively, if the existence of an upward trend
in the ratio caused by factors other than price movements isas-
sumed, one would be led to expect the increase in the ratio to be
more rapid during periods of falling than of rising prices.
These theoretical expectations are only partly borne out by a
survey of actual developments. The rapid rise of the ratio during
the Great Depression (at the rate of one-half per cent of national
assets per year), when prices experienced their sharpest decline on
record, and the decline in the ratio between 1945 and 1949, when
prices rose sharply, both conform entirely to expectations. It might
also be claimed that the relatively slow rise in the ratio between
1922 and 1929 (of only 0.15 per cent of national assets per year)
in the face of a sharp advance in the prices of most equities and
some types of real estate, as well as the stability of the ratio between
1949 and 1952, when asset prices (other than common stock) rose
only moderately, can be reconciled with the theory. On the other
hand, the rise in the ratio during the longer periods of 1901 to
1922 and 1934 to 1945, which together account for nearly two-
thirds of the entire period, is difficult to explain. In these two
periods the ratio increased by 0.14 and by 0.62 per cent of national
assets a year while prices rose substantially and almost continu-
ously. For the 1930's the apparent deviation from the theory may'
possibly be explained by the extraordinary strength of other fac-
tors, particularly (1) the sharp upward movement in Cambridge k
and(2) the marked increase in the evaluation of the advantages
15Thereis perhaps only one case in American experience in which the devia-
tion of an important type of asset prices from the general price level was pro.
longed and very pronounced. This was the extraordinary advance in common
stock prices during the late 1920's which reflected the decline (as it turned out,
temporary) in the rate of capitalization of current income or a serious 'over-
estimation of future income from stocks.
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of indirect holding of claims, which together completely overbal-
anced the basic tendency of rising prices to stop, or at least to
brake, advances in the ratio of financial intermediaries' to national
assets. Two of the three remaining periods (1913 to 1922 and 1940
to 1945) in which prices and the ratio rise together—prices sharply,
the ratio moderately—are, of course, strongly influenced by the
heavy accumulation of deadweight debt financed to a substantial
extent by an expansion of money in circulation, a development
from which one would expect an increase in the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets. The conclusion from this first
glance at the figures apparently must be that a price movement
needs to be very sharp to have a patent, and inverse, influence on
the observed share of financial intermediaries in national assets.
This does. not mean that price movements do not at all times ex-
ercise an influence on that share, but only that during the past
fifty years their influence generally seems to have been more than
offset by other factors.
Some experimentation with the figures indicates that the ap-
parent lack of clear evidence of the theoretically expected effects of
price movements on the share of financial intermediaries in na-
tional assets may be due to the roughness of the first approach. In-
deed it is probable that if the upward trends of the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets and of the level of asset prices,
both of which have been so prominent during the past fifty years,
are eliminated, a relation of the theoretically expected character
emerges with reasonable clarity. Thus, correlation of the annual
rate of change (calculated from data for the twelve benchmark
dates from 1870 through 1952) in the ratio of financial intermedi-
aries' to national assets(S) and in an index of asset prices(P;
tangible assets and common stock weighted 4 and 1respectively)
yields the relation:
S=—0.935P+ 3.17
with a correlation coefficient of —0.67. This may be interpreted to
indicate that:
I. When asset prices remain unchanged there has been a tenden-
cy for the ratio of financial intermediaries in national assets to
increase by slightly over 3 per cent per year.
2. An annual increase in asset prices by, say, 2 per cent, is as a
rule accompanied by an increase in the ratio of 11/4 per cent a year,
while a price decrease of equal magnitude implies an increase in
the ratio of over 5 per cent.
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3. Asset price movements statistically "explain" almost one-half
of the observed variations in the share of financial intermediaries
in national assets (R2—0.45).
Although it is not possible to array in order of theoretical im-
portance the factors which have been designated here as the ulti-
mate economic determinants, experience in this country during
the past half century suggests that three of them are dominant: the
financial interrelations ratio, the deadweight debt ratio, and the
movement of asset prices. These three factors, it should be remem-
bered, are not independent, since the second and third are reflected
in the financial interrelations ratio, although they do not deter-
mine it.
To proceed to an analysis of the forces behind those three fac-
tors would be inviting, but seems outside the province of this
study.1° It is evident, however, that the analysis would immediately
touch on fundamental economic factors such as the character of
the country's economic and particularly its financial organization,
the presence of large-scale war expenditures and their financing,
and basic monetary policies.
4. The Outlook
A thorough evaluation of the outlook for the position of financial
intermediaries in the economic structure of the United States, or
even of only the share of financial intermediaries in national assets,
is entirely beyond the scope of this chapter. All that can be done is
to consider briefly whether those trends in the share of financial
intermediaries in national assets and in its components and deter-
minants that have been observed during the fifty to a hundred
years are likely to continue in the future, i.e. for the next two to
three decades. Even within this narrow scope, whatever can be
said must be tentative.
Looking at trend of financial intermediaries in national
assets during the last century as it appears in Chart 1, above, we
may easily form the impression of a fairly regular growth, and from
that impression may infer that continuation of the trend is a reason-
able assumption to make. The ratio doubled during the second
half of the nineteenth century, and again doubled during the first
16Afew tentative steps in that direction were taken in "The National Balance
Sheet of the United States of America, 1900.1949," income and Wealth, Series IV,
Cambridge, Bowes and Bowes, 1955, and in "Financial Structure and Economic
Growth in Advanced Countries," Capital Formation and Economic Growth,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956.
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half of this century. There is, however, sufficient irregularity in the
figures, particularly in the absence of any net increase in the ratio
between 1949 and 1952, to raise doubts whether the secular trend
that operated during most of the past one hundred years is still
continuing at full strength. Tentative judgment about this ques-
tion requires a glance at the components of the trend and their
determinants, especially the first three main components of the
basic relation as they have been distinguished in the preceding
discussion. We may forego examination of the fourth component
(the share of financial intermediaries' equity in national assets)
because of its small absolute size and the apparent lack of pro-
nounced or sustained movements (Chart 2).
a. RATIO OF INSURANCE RESERVES TO NATIONAL ASSETS
Of the main components of the share of financial intermediaries in
national assets, the one most amenable to an appraisal of outlook
is the share of insurance reserves in household assets.11
Its first component, the share of life insurance reserves in house-
hold assets, has remained fairly stable since 1g33, as is shown in
Table 4. A substantial increase is, of course, possible if a radical
shift from straight line to endowment types of insurance occurred,
or if beneficiaries should rapidly adapt the face value of their
policies to the sharp increase in the cost of living since the 1930's.
Some movements in both directions may be expected, but there is
no reason to assume that they will be strong enough to lead to more
than a modest increase beyond the present share of life insurance
reserves in national assets.'8
In the case of reserves of social insurance and pension plans, on
the other hand, the evidence indicates a continuation of the upward
trend, although at a less pronounced rate than that observed dur-
ing the past twenty years, which may be regarded as the formative
period for this type of financial intermediaries. First, the proportion
of the population above retirement age covered by pension and re-
tirement plans is likely to continue to increase. However, the rate
of increase must lessen markedly, since most wage and salary earners
17 The correction factor (the share of households in national assets) can proba-
bly be assumed to continue on the level which it has maintained without sub-
stantial change throughout the past fifty years.
18 The movements of national assets themselves, of course, are dependent upon
changes in national income, the capital-output ratio, the financial interrelations
.ratio, and the price level. I am not bold enough to discuss the outlook for each
of these four factors, let alone for a specific combination of them.
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CHART 2
of Liabilities and Equity
National Assets, Benchmark Dates, 1900-1952
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though not necessarily in the immediate future—as the plans be-
come older, and this may turn out to be the quantitatively most
important factor in reducing the rate of growth of pension funds.
If these were the only factors, one would be fairly safe in expect-
ing a continuing increase in the rate of social security and pension
plan reserves to national assets, although at a much slower rate
than that observed during the past twenty years. Changes in the
rates earned on reserves are not likely to upset this expectation. The
decisive factor may therefore be the presence or absence of a sub-
stantial change in the ratio of actual reserves to actuarially required
reserves. So far as private pension plans are concerned, the ratio
is more likely to rise than to decline; this would constitute an addi-
tional factor making for an increase in the ratio of total insurance
reserves to national assets. There is a possibility, however, that
government social insurance funds, whose reserves are already well
below their actuarial level (very difficult to calculate because of the
periodic adjustments in benefits not provided for in the original
contract, if the underlying legislation is regarded as such),bo may
shift more and more towards a pay-as-you-go basis. If such a move-
ment became pronounced, it could stop the trend towards a further
increase in the ratio of pension and retirement reserves to national
assets and might even reverse it.
b. RATIO OF MONEY TO NATIONAL ASSETS
An evaluation of the outlook for movements in the ratio of the
volume of money to aggregate national assets would require nothing
less than an appraisal of the trend in Cambridge k and in the capi-
tal-output ratio, not to speak of several other factors. That is more
than can be undertaken here.
Probably neither the sharp increase in k during the 1930's (which
reflected a sudden growth in inactive money) nor the pronounced
19Onerecent estimate put actuarially required reserves for social security
funds at $200 to $300 billion (M. A. Linton, Michigan Business Review, July
1953, p.18) —note the immense margin in the figures—as against the actual
figure of less than $40 billion. If the estimate refers to reserves required when the
estimate was made, they would amount to approximately 7 to 11 per cent of
total national assets of 1952 (one.third to one-half of the present aggregate share
of financial intermediaries in national assets). Should the estimate be applicable
instead to the period when the ratio of reserves to national assets may be ex-
pected to level off—a date at least several decades distant—then the increase
in the ratio of financial intermediaries' total to national assets would, of course,
be considerably smaller because of the upward trend in total national assets,
and might easily be only half as large.
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decline between 1945 and 1952 (which has partly reversed the rise
of the1930's) represent long-term movements. We may rather
venture the opinion that the trend of the ratio of money to national
output is likely to be horizontal or only slightly upwards during
the period with which we are concerned.20
The capiçal-output ratio, which is inversely related to the ratio
of money to national assets, has been low during the last twenty
years compared to its level during the preceding fifty to seventy-
five years for which we have information. Hence, if there is a defi-
nite movement in the ratio it may be expected to be upwards, in
continuation of the trend observed between 1945 and 1949, which
apparently has come to a halt in the last few years. Even if an up-
ward movement occurs, however, there is doubt whether it will re-
store the capital-output ratio fully to its pre-1930 level.
Taking the movements of the ratio of money to output and the
capital output ratio together, and trusting that changes in the three
other components of the ratio of money to national assets,
and will, as before, be small or offsetting, we ought
not to expect a substantial change in the ratio of money to national
assets: the two main factors which influence it are not expected to
show very pronounced movements, and insofar as such movements
develop, they are more likely to affect the over-all ratio of money
to national assets in an opposite rather than the same direction.
C. RATIO OF OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES (EX-
CLUDING MONEY AND INSURANCE RESERVES) TO NATIONAL ASSETS
This component is probably the one for which the outlook is most
difficult to evaluate, yet also the one of greatest significance for the
theory of financial intermediaries. The ratio, has failed to show a
marked trend since 1933, after a substantial increase for a period
of at least thirty and probably more than fifty years. To judge prob-
able trends it is necessary to look separately at the two components
20Thelatest and most detailed analysis of the secular trend in the velocity of
money (the reciprocal of the ratio of money in circulation to the value of output)
concludes that there is a downward secular trend in that ratio and that it may
be assumed to continue (C. Warburton, Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXIII,
pp. 86-90. Warburton, however, includes time deposits in commercial banks,
which have been excluded from the ratio This, of course, means a
rising trend in the ratio of money to output. Warburton's conclusion, however,
is not undisputed among monetary theorists(see the citations in E. Doblin,
Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXIII, 1949, p. 201; Doblin himself asserts,
p. 205, on the basis of international data, "It seems that in the course of a coun-
try's economic growth, its income velocity declines.").THE MEANING OF THE FINDINGS
of the ratio: the share of liabilities of financial intermediaries in
total liabilities(excluding money and insurance reserves from
both); and the ratio of total liabilities to national assets.
Tue second component has fluctuated widely without showing
a marked secular trend, at least since late in the nineteenth century.
It is obviously very sensitive to the changes in deadweight debt and
to large-scale movements in asset prices. If we may assume that in
the absence of a major war no substantial increase will occur in the
deadweight debt of the federal government and that only a slow
and moderate rise in the price level of assets is to be expected, then
itis not likely that the ratio of national liabilities(excluding
money and insurance reserves) to national assets will rise sub-
stantially, although it may well advance somewhat beyond its pres-
ent historically rather low level.
The first component, the ratio of financial intermediaries' to total
national liabilities (excluding money and insurance reserves), has
shown a definite though irregular trend upward since 1900 except
during World War 11 and the Great Depression. If a continuation
is to be expected, the expectation would be based mainly on the
general tendency towards the institutionalization of creditor-debtor
relationships in the economy, a tendency clearly evident over the
last half century.
Considering the two. subcomponents in combination, a slight up-
ward trend in the ratio of financial intermediaries' to total national
liabilities (excluding money and insurance reserves) is more likely
than a substantial decline, .ancl more likely, even, than a horizontal
movement.
d. TOTAL SHARE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN NATIONAL ASSETS
The considerations advanced in the preceding pages lead to the
tentative conclusion that three of the four main components of
the share of financial intermediaries in national assets(the ratios
of money, insurance reserves, and other liabilities of financial in-
termediaries to national assets) are more likely to increase than to
remain unchanged or to decrease, while the fourth component
(financial intermediaries' share in total equity) is small and is not
expected to change much.
Evaluation of past trends and of their components and deter-
minants thus leads one to expect a further increase in the share
of total assets of financial intermediaries to aggregate national
assets beyond the present level of slightly more than one-fifth.
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Similar considerations make it very unlikely, however, that the in-
crease could be at the average rate observed between 1860 and
1952 (approximately 1.8 per cent per year as calculated from the
logarithms of the values of the ratio), or even at the rate calculated
for the period from 1900 to 1952 (1.6 per cent per year). Such rates
would result in shares of financial intermediaries in national assets
of 35 (32) per cent in 1970 and 58 (52) per cent in the year 2000.21
While such ratios cannot be ruled out on the basis of what we know
about the general theory of financial intermediaries,22 it does not
appear likely that they will be reached (particularly those which
imply a continuation of the 1860 to 1952 rate of increase), barring
large-scale war expenditures financed primarily by borrowing from
financial intermediaries.
There are, however, three factors which might upset this con-
clusion and would permit considerably higher shares of financial
intermediaries in national assets than can now be anticipated. The
first of these—and a rather unlikely one—is a substantial increase
in the layering ratio of financial intermediaries, a ratio which has
been remarkably stable during the past fifty years.23
The second is a sharp increase in the ratio of actual to actuarially
required reserves of government trust and pension funds. Such an
increase, it has been argued, is unlikely. Indeed, a decline in the
ratio is at least as probable as an advance.
The third possibility is a large-scale increase in the indirect hold-
ing of corporate stock. Up to the present time indirect holding of
stock is still the exception rather than the rule, particularly if the
holdings of stock in personal trust accounts administered by banks
and trust companies, which are of a rather special character, are
21Backwardextrapolation of the 1860 to 1952 rate of increase of the ratio
leads to a value of slightly less than 2 per cent in 1805, a figure which is entirely
compatible with the very rough estimates that can be made for the actual ratio
of financial intermediaries' to total national assets in that year. This, of course,
may be nothing more than a coincidence that might disappear or weaken if
better figures were available for national assets and for the assets of financial
intermediaries during the nineteenth century.
22Continuationof the trend obtained from the ten ratios from 1870 through
1945, however, is almost impossible, as it implies a share of financial intermedi-
aries in national assets of approximately 75 per cent in 2000. This is just a
warning against uncritical use of extrapolated trend values.
23Sinceunincorporated business enterprises have been regarded as independent
economic Units, so that their equity reappears among proprietors' assets, shifts
between corporate and unincorporated business in themselves would not affect
the size of national assets or the share of financial intermediaries in them. Large-
scale shifts inthis relationship, moreover, arc not likely and in fact have
virtually been absent for the last twenty-five years.
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disregarded. A situation is at least imaginable, however, in which
a high proportion of the stock in large corporations which is now
owned in individually small amounts would be held not by the
ultimate owners themselves but through intermediary institutions
like investment companies. But even if we assume that at some
future time as much as three-fourths of all corporate stock would
be held indirectly (compared to about one-third in 1952)24this
would not in the present, or in a similar, situation increase the
ratio of financial intermediaries' assets to national assets by much
more than 0.05 points (i.e. by not quite one-fourth of the present
ratio). Hence, even such a radical change in financial practices
would by itself be far from sufficient to increase the shares of finan-
cial intermediaries in national assets to the figures obtained for the
end of this century by straight line extrapolation of the increase
in financial intermediaries' share observed over the last fifty to
one hundred years.
Straight line interpolation, whether of the original ratios, or,
more appropriately (because rates of growth are involved), of their
logarithms, may not be the best procedure, as Chart 1 shows. A
parabolic trend, implying declining rates of growth, seems to fit
the observed data somewhat more closely. If such an extrapolation
is based on the logarfthms of the thirteen ratios between 1860 and
1952, the curve obtained indicates a ratio of approximately 33 per
cent in 1970 (compared to an actual ratio of 22 per cent in 1952)
and one of slightly more than 50 per cent in 2000. Like all extra-
polations this one is implicitly based on the assumption of a con-
tinuation of the basic forces at work in the past and on the absence
of radical changes in structure, and thus must be severely qualified
as an indicator of things to come. Its results do not seem to be
ruled out by our experience with the rate of expansion of financial
intermediaries in the United States. The extrapolated values, how-
ever, are still considerably higher than those obtained by an evalua-
tion of the individual components of the ratio of financial inter-
mediaries' to national assets attempted earlier in this section. In
other words the more detailed, though still quite rudimentary and
tentative, evaluation of the forces now at work implies a decelera-
tion or retardati6n in the rate of increase of financial intermedi-
aries' share in national assets compared to the rate indicated by
nothing but the trend itself of this share during the past century.
24Indirectholdings here include not only those by financial intermediaries (in-
cluding personal trust departments), but also the minority holdings of corpora-
tions other than financial intermediaries.
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